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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Larry Lee James Stadtmiller appeals from the judgment of conviction and
sentence entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of sexual abuse of a minor
under sixteen years of age.

Stadtmiller specifically challenges the district court's

refusal, prior to trial, to allow him to enter an Alford 1 plea of guilt to an amended charge
of felony injury to child; he also asserts that his sentence of nine years with three years
fixed is excessive.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Proceedings
According to the trial testimony, Stacy Ruzicka, a former boyfriend of Lori
Esquivel, helped raise Lori's daughter, "K.E.," who was born in 2001. 2 (10/10/12 Tr.,
p.74, L.13 - p.75, L.16; p.100, Ls.3-8. 3) Ruzicka allowed his friend, Stadtmiller, to live
in either his house or camper for about a year.

(10/10/12 Tr., p.77, Ls.3-19.) During

Christmas vacation in 2011, K.E. and Ruzicka's own daughter, J.R., visited him and
stayed at his house while Stadtmiller was also staying there. (10/10/12 Tr., p.80, Ls.1025.) On Christmas eve, K.E. and J.R. went to sleep in the living room; K.E. slept on the
couch and J.R. slept on the recliner. (10/10/12 Tr., p.82, L.23 - p.83, L.2.) K.E. was
wearing a long T-shirt-like Mickey Mouse shirt and underwear.

1

(10/10/12 Tr., p.106,

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

Ruzicka testified that he shared a child in common ("J.R-.") with Lori Esquivel, his
former girlfriend. (10/10/12 Tr., p.73, L.5 - p.74, L.20.) When Ruzicka met Lori, she
was pregnant with K.E., and after K.E. was born, Ruzicka considered her like his own
daughter and helped to raise her. (10/10/12 Tr., p.75, Ls.3-16.)
2

3

All references to "10/10/12 Tr." are to the trial transcript that began at 11 :29 a.m. on
that date - not the 10/10/12 transcript that began at 9:12 a.m. with jury selection.
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Ls.6-21.) After she fell asleep, K.E. was woken up when Stadtmiller walked into the
living room. (10/10/12 Tr., p.107, Ls.8-19.) Stadtmiller covered J.R. with a blanket that
fallen off, and then picked up K.

's blanket and put it on her, picked up her legs,

sat down, and put her legs on top of him. (10/10/12 Tr., p.108, Ls.6-21.) K.E. described
what happened next:
Then he started rubbing my legs, and then he started like rubbing my
arms. And then he rubbed right here like my waist, and then after that he
touched my vagina, and I started screaming around for like ten seconds.
(10/10/12 Tr., p.108, L.24 - p.109, L3.) K.E. explained that Stadtmiller was "putting his
hands and squeezing" her vagina for about ten seconds, and when he stopped for a
second and then "started doing it again," she got up, went to the bathroom, and then
went to tell her dad (Ruzicka). (10/10/12 Tr., p.109, Ls.7-25.) According to Ruzicka,
when K.

reported the incident to him she was crying, and when he went to the hallway

to find Stadtmiller, Stadtmiller was gone.

(10/10/12 Tr., p.84, Ls.2-11.)

The next

morning, Ruzicka reported the incident to law enforcement. (10/10/12 Tr., p.85, Ls.519.)
The state charged Stadtmiller with sexual abuse of a child under sixteen. (R.,
pp.17-18.)

On April 25, 2012, the parties entered into a verbal agreement whereby

Stadtmiller would enter an Alford guilty plea to felony injury to a child, with joint
recommendations for, inter a/ia, probation and .a psychosexual evaluation (and any
recommended counseling). (R., pp.30-31; 4/25/12 Tr., p.5, L.9 - p.6, L.17.) However,
the district court refused to accept the Alford plea because Stadtmiller neither admitted
guilt nor claimed he was unable to recall committing the crime because he was under

2

the influence of alcohol, drugs, or had some other physical injury.

(R., pp.30-31;

4/25/12 Tr., p.27, L.9 - p.28, L.1; p.29, Ls.16-22; p.30, Ls.15-24.)
The next day, the parties entered into a Rule 11 binding plea agreement in which
Stadtmiller pied guilty to an amended charge of felony injury to a child, and the parties
agreed to recommend at sentencing that Stadtmiller would not be ordered to serve any
additional jail, would be placed on supervised probation, and would obtain a
psychosexual evaluation and follow any recommendation of that evaluation. (R., pp.3236.) The Rule 11 plea agreement bound the district court to its terms if, after reviewing
the presentence report and evaluations, the court agreed to accept the plea.

(Id.;

7/19/12 Tr., p.36, L.17 - p.37, L.2.) After reviewing the report and evaluations, the court
refused to accept the Rule 11 plea agreement because Stadtmiller continued to deny
guilt, which made it "impossible for [him] to start counseling, let alone complete
including [sic], so probation is not viable." (R., pp.46-47; 7/19/12 Tr., p.37, L.2 - p.38,
L.14.)
At trial, a jury convicted Stadtmiller of sexual abuse of a child under the age of
sixteen years. (R., p.63.) The district court sentenced Stadtmiller to a unified nine year
term with three years fixed. (R., pp.76-78.) Stadtmiller filed a timely notice of appeal.
(R., pp.79-81.)

3

ISSUES
Stadtmiller phrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it rejected
Stadtmiller's first attempted Alford plea?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified
sentence of nine years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Stadtmiller
following his conviction for sexual abuse of a minor child?

(Appellant's Brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Assuming the district court applied an incorrect legal standard in rejecting
Stadtmiller's Alford plea, is such error harmless?
2. Has Stadtmiller failed to establish that his sentence is excessive?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Assuming The District Court Applied An Incorrect Legal Standard In Rejecting
Stadtmiller's Alford Plea. Such Error Is Harmless

A.

Introduction
The district court refused to accept Stadtmiller's attempted Alford plea because

( 1) the factual basis he asserted during the plea colloquy was inconsistent with guilt and
(2) Stadtmiller did not assert that he was unable to recall committing the criminal act.
(R., pp.30-31; 4/25/12 Tr., p.27, L.9 - p.28, L.1; p.29, Ls.16-22; p.30, Ls.15-24.)
Stadtmiller contends that by categorically limiting the applicability of an Alford plea to
those two situations, the district court abused its discretion because it "did not act
consistently with the legal standards applicable to whether to accept an Alford plea."
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.)
Stadtmiller's contention that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard
in deciding whether to accept his Alford plea appears to be well-taken. Assuming such
an error occurred, it was harmless. In the event the error is not found harmless, this
case should be remanded to the district court for a determination of whether it would
have accepted Stadtmiller's Alford plea under the correct legal standard.

B.

Standard Of Review
A district court's refusal to accept an Alford guilty plea is reviewable for abuse of

discretion.

Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 627, 226 P.3d 1269, 1274 (2010).

"In

considering a claimed abuse of discretion, [the appellate court] applies a three-factor
test focusing upon: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and
5

consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and
(3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason."

C.

kl

Although Stadtmiller's Denial Of Guilt Did Not Legally Preclude His Alford Plea,
The Error Is Harmless Because The Record Shows. Beyond A Reasonable
Doubt, Without It, The District Court Would Have Exercised Its Discretion By
Rejecting Stadtmiller's Alford Plea
In Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 628, 226 P.3d 1269, 1275 (2010), the Idaho

Supreme Court explained the law applicable to Alford pleas:
In Afford, the United States Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
acceptance of a guilty plea from a defendant even though he asserted
factual innocence to the charge of second degree murder. 400 U.S. 25,
91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162. In that case, the trial court heard evidence
from various witnesses that strongly indicated Alford's guilt before
accepting his plea. Id. at 27, 91 S.Ct. at 162, 27 L.Ed.2d at 166. Alford
then testified that:
I pleaded guilty on second degree murder because they said
there is too much evidence, but I ain't shot no man, but I take
the fault for the other man. We never had an argument in
our life and I just pleaded guilty because they said if I didn't
they would gas me for it, and that is all.
Id. at 29 n. 2, 91 S.Ct. at 163 n.2, 27 L.Ed.2d at 166 n.2[.] The Supreme
Court found such a plea to be constitutionally permissible so long as the
charge is supported by a strong factual basis. In sum, the Court held that
"[a]n individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and
understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he
is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the
crime." Id. Idaho recognized the validity of an Alford plea as early as
1981 when we stated, "[a]s long as there is a strong factual basis for the
plea, and the defendant understands the charges against him, a voluntary
plea of guilty may be accepted by the court despite a continuing claim by
the defendant that he is innocent." Sparrow v. State, 102 Idaho 60, 61,
625 P.2d 414, 415 (1981) (citing Alford, 400 U.S. at 25, 91 S.Ct. at 161,
27 L.Ed.2d at 162).
(Emphasis added.) In Schoger the Idaho Supreme Court held that because Schoger
did not provide a strong factual basis for her Alford plea in her colloquy with the court,
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and her attorney expressed doubt about whether a factual basis could be shown, 4 the
district court had "reasoned reservations about whether a factual basis existed for
Schoger's guilty plea[,]" and did not abuse its discretion in rejecting her Alford plea.
Schoger, 148 Idaho at 628-629, 226 P.3d at 1275-1276.
Here, in contrast to Schoger, the prosecutor attempted to provide a factual basis
for Stadtmiller's Alford plea to the amended charge of felony injury to child. (4/25/12 Tr.,
p.12, L.20 - p.13, L.13.)

However, the district court refused to accept Stadtmiller's

Alford plea, stating, "I can only accept the plea, number one, if you admit guilt, or
number two, under certain circumstances where you're under the influence of drugs or
alcohol to the point where you don't remember what happened." (4/25/12 Tr., p.27,
Ls.17-21; see

kL

p.27, L.23 - p.28, L.1 ("But clearly you remember everything that

happened ... and you haven't admitted any guilt, and under the law I can't accept a
plea of guilty if you aren't guilty"); p.29, Ls.17-19 ("Well, under those circumstances ...
you haven't admitted guilt as far as I can tell, and it isn't an Alford situation."); p.30,
Ls.11-24 ("[T]his isn't an Alford situation. You weren't drunk beyond the point where
you can't remember or under the influence of drugs which you can't remember, which is
what an Alford Plea [sic] is, or head injury or something like that.

But based on

everything you've said you haven't indicated that you have committed any crime.").)
The district court's comments that, in order to qualify as an Alford plea,
Stadtmiller had to either admit his criminal act (in which case there would be no need for
an "Alford" plea) or assert he could not recall his criminal conduct, is inconsistent with

4

The Schoger opinion does not divulge whether, in keeping with common practice, the
prosecutor attempted to supply a factual basis for Schoger's Alford plea. See generally
Schoger, 148 Idaho 622, 226 P.3d 1269.

7

the standard set forth in Schoger. 5 As Schoger explained,:

"'[a]s long as there is a

strong factual basis for the plea, and the defendant understands the charges against
him, a voluntary plea of guilty may be accepted by the court despite a continuing claim
by the defendant that he is innocent."' Schoger, 148 Idaho at 628, 226 P.3d at 1275
(quoting Sparrow, 102 Idaho at 61, 625 P.2d at 415).
In light of the district court's various statements that it did not have discretion to
accept Stadtmiller's Alford plea unless he either admitted guilt or claimed he could not
recall the criminal incident, the court appears to have employed an incorrect standard of
law. However, any error is harmless.
Stadtmiller's attempt to enter an Alford plea to an amended charge of felony
injury to child would have been rejected even if the district court recognized it had
discretion to accept the plea despite Stadtmiller's denial of guilt. Because the record
shows that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the district court would have rejected
Stadtmiller's Alford plea under the correct legal standard, the error was harmless. State
v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221-222, 245 P.3d 961, 973-974 (2010).
The terms of the Alford-based plea agreement required Stadtmiller to obtain a
psychosexual evaluation from Steve Lindsley and for both parties to recommend that
Stadtmiller be "placed on probation subject to the terms and conditions set by the Court,
which would include counseling if recommended by Mr. Lindsey [sic]." (4/25/12 Tr., p.6,

There is no hint in Alford that an Alford plea should be limited to where a defendant
either admits guilt or asserts an inability to recall the criminal incident. Alford denied
shooting the victim, and faced with a possible death penalty for first degree murder, pied
guilty to second degree murder to avoid such penalty. Alford, 400 U.S. 25. The Court
stated: "An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly
consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit
his participation in the acts constituting the crime." Alford, 400 U.S. at 37.
5

8

Ls. 1-13.) However, Stadtmiller's attempt to enter an Alford plea during the April 25,
2012, hearing failed due to his refusal to admit guilt or assert he could not recall the
criminal incident. As a result, prior to rejecting Stadtmiller's Alford plea, the district court
did not reach the point of considering whether, by denying guilt, Stadtmiller could be a
viable candidate for probation and counseling.
Those questions were subsequently answered after Stadtmiller entered into a
binding Rule 11 plea agreement in which he pied guilty to an amended charge of felony
injury to child, and which required the court to consider the presentence report and
other evaluations prior to sentencing in deciding whether it would accept the Rule 11
agreement.

(R., pp.32, 34-38; 7/19/12 Tr., p.36, Ls.17-25.)

On July 19, 2012, the

district court held a hearing in which it rejected Stadtmiller's Rule 11 plea agreement,
explaining:
I'm not going to accept the Rule 11 agreement for two reasons. One is
the same problem we had last time when you entered a plea. You didn't
think you did anything wrong, and these evaluations indicate that you still
don't feel that you did anything criminal or did anything wrong ....
The other part of it is, is the plea agreement was for supervised
probation, which involves some type of counselings [sic], CSC or whatever
it might be. All counseling, doesn't matter what it is, all counseling starts
with one thing: The person has to sit there in front of everybody else and
say, well, I did these things and they're criminal, and I knew they were
wrong and I own up to them and I'm facing up to them. You don't think
you did anything wrong, and so it's impossible for you to start counseling,
let alone complete including [sic], so probation is not viable.
So, for those reasons the Court is not accepting the Rule 11
agreement.
(7/19/12 Tr., p.37, L.2- p.18, L.4.) In short, the district court rejected Stadtmiller's guilty
plea to an amended charge of felony injury to child because he continued to deny his

9

criminal conduct 6 and, accordingly, would not be able to comply with the counseling
· requirements of probation.
By the same token, although the terms of Stadtmiller's Alford-based plea
agreement did not require the court to grant probation, the agreement required both
parties to recommend probation and counseling (as recommended by the psychosexual
evaluator), and it appears that probation and counseling were considered certainties. 7
Even if the court had recognized it had discretion to accept Stadtmiller's Alford plea
without an admission of guilt, it would have rejected such a plea based on its general
discretionary decision to not accept pleas of guilt unless the defendant actually admits
guiit and can succeed on probation. See Schoger, 148 Idaho at 630, 226 P.3d at 1277
("We hereby remove all doubt by holding that no provision of Idaho law, including I.C.R.
11, requires a court to accept a guilty plea. Acceptance of such a plea is specifically
within the discretion of the trial court.) As the court explained to Stadtmiller at the Rule
11 hearing, "You don't think you did anything wrong, and so it's impossible for you to

The amended charge of felony injury to child alleged that Stadtmiller caused K. E.
mental suffering by "rubbing her in her vaginal area on the outside of her clothing." (R.,
p.37.) The original Information charged Stadtmiller with sexual abuse of a child under
the age of sixteen, alleging he placed "his hands upon the legs, breasts and genitals" of
K.E. (R., p.17.)
6

The prosecutor explained that both parties would recommend Stadtmiller's release
that same day, Stadtmiller (erroneously, it turns out) had no felony record, the state
would not oppose a withheld judgment, and Stadtmiller would obtain a psychosexual
evaluation and "be placed on probation subject to the terms and conditions set by the
Court, which would include counseling if recommended by [the evaluator]." (4/25/12 Tr.,
p.6. Ls.1-13.)
7
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start counseling, let alone complete including [sic], so probation is not viable."8 (7 /19/12
Tr., p.37, L.24 - p.38, L.2.)
Just as the district court exercised its discretion in rejecting Stadtmiller's Rule 11
plea by concluding that probation and counseling were not viable options, 9 it would
have, beyond a reasonable doubt, done likewise in regard to Stadtmiller's proffered
Alford plea. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 221-222, 245 P.3d at 973-974. Therefore, even if
the district court committed an error in rejecting Stadtmiller's Alford plea, such error was
harmless.

D.

If The Error Is Not Harmless, This Case Should Be Remanded To The District
Court To Determine Whether, Utilizing The Correct Legal Standard, It Would
Have Accepted Stadtmiller's Alford Plea
Assuming that the error in this case is not deemed harmless, the proper remedy

is to remand the case to the district court for a determination of whether, applying the
proper legal standard for an Alford plea, it would have accepted Stadtmiller's Alford

See Steele v. State, 153 Idaho 783, 791 n.9, 291 P.3d 466, 474 n.9 (Ct. App. 2012)
("Nonetheless, this case highlights problems that may be encountered when an Alford
plea is entered in a sex offense case. Consequently, the best practice may be to avoid
the entry of Alford pleas in sex offense cases".).
8

It is generally well-settled that a trial court has .broad discretion to reject a guilty plea
when the defendant refuses to admit his participation in the crime or continues to assert
his innocence. ~ . United States v. O'Brien, 601 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (9 th Cir. 1979)
(rule requiring acceptance of plea of person claiming actual innocence would not
promote public policy); United States v. Martin, 528 F.3d 746 (10th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Preciado, 336 F.3d 739, 743 (8 th Cir. 2003); United States v. HernandezRivas, 513 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2008) (rejection of guilty plea where defendant would not
provide adequate factual basis for plea was proper); State v. Williams, 851 S.W.2d 828
(Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 1992); State v. Clanton, 612 P.2d 662, 667 (Kan. App. 1980);
Howard v. State, 458 A.2d 1180, 1184-85 (Del. 1983) (no error for court to reject plea of
defendant professing innocence); People v. Ottomanelli, 505 N.E.2d 1328 (Ill. App.
1987) ("a court is not obliged to accept a plea of guilty from a defendant who professes
innocence").
9
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plea. United States v. Rashad, 396

3d 398, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (case remanded to

trial court to determine whether it would have accepted Alford plea had it understood it
had discretion to do so).

Lafler v. Coooer, --- U.S.----, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012). 10

Here, as in Rashad, because the district court incorrectly concluded Stadtmiller
was "not eligible" to enter an Alford plea without admitting guilt, it did not determine
whether the factual basis presented by the prosecutor "was sufficiently strong to justify
an Alford plea," Rashad, 396 F.3d at 402, nor whether, in its discretion, it would have
accepted such a plea. Therefore, even if the error in this case were not harmless, the

In Lafler v. Cooper, --- U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 1376, the Supreme Court determined that
trial counsel for Respondent Cooper had provided ineffective assistance by advising
Cooper to reject a plea offer (to dismiss two of four charges with a recommendation of
51-to-85 month sentences) that led to trial and conviction on all four counts and a
mandatory minimum sentence of 185-to-360 months. The Court rejected the state's
argument that a "fair trial wipes clean any deficient performance by defense counsel
during plea bargaining[,]" id. at 1388, and in considering prejudice under Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court found that Cooper "has shown that but for
counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability he and the trial court
would have accepted the guilty plea." Lafler, --- U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. at 1391 Even
though the Court made those "probability" findings, it allowed the trial court to exercise
its discretion to determine whether the jury convictions should be vacated, stating:
10

As a remedy, the District Court ordered specific performance of the
original plea agreement. The correct remedy in these circumstances,
however, is to order the State to reoffer the plea agreement. Presuming
respondent accepts the offer, the state trial court can then exercise its
discretion in determining whether to vacate the convictions and
resentence respondent pursuant to the plea agreement, to vacate only
some of the convictions and resentence respondent accordingly, or to
leave the convictions and sentence from trial undisturbed. See Mich. Ct.
Rule 6.302(C)(3) (2011) ("If there is a plea agreement and its terms
provide for the defendant's plea to be made in exchange for a specific
sentence recommendation, the court may ... reject the agreement.").
Today's decision leaves open to the trial court how best to exercise that
discretion in all the circumstances of the case.
~

(emphasis added).
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proper remedy would be to remand it to the district court for a determination, utilizing its
discretion, of whether to accept an Alford plea from Stadtmiller. Rashad, 396 F.3d at
403; see Lafler, n.9, supra; Missouri v. Frye, --- U.S.----, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012). 11

11.
Stadtmiller Has Failed To Establish His Sentence Is Excessive
A.

Introduction
Stadtmiller claims his sentence for sexual abuse of a minor under sixteen years

of age is excessive and asserts the district court abused its discretion at sentencing by
failing to give adequate consideration to the mitigating factors of his substance abuse
problems and support for his family. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-18.) Stadtmiller has failed
to meet his burden of establishing the district court abused its discretion at sentencing.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a defendant alleges an excessive sentence on appeal the appellate court

conducts an independent review of the record that considers the nature of the offense,
the defendant's character and protection of society. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771,
772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982) "Absent a showing of a clear abuse of
discretion, a sentence within statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal." State v.
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 604, 768 P.2d 1331, 1337 (1989).

"To show an abuse of

In Missouri v. Frye, --- U.S.----, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1411 (2012), decided the same day
as Lafler, where trial counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate a plea offer (visa-vis providing ill-advice to reject a plea offer as in Lafler), the Supreme Court
remanded the case for further proceedings to determine: (1) if the prosecutor could
have cancelled the plea agreement, and if so, whether Frye could show a reasonable
probability the prosecutor would have adhered to the agreement, and (2) whether the
trial court could have refused to accept the plea agreement, and if so, whether Frye
could show a reasonable probability the trial court would have accepted the plea.
11
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discretion, [Stadtmiller] must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts." State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139,
149, 191 P.3d 217, 227 (2008) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472,
475 (2002)).

C.

Stadtmiller Has Failed To Establish His Sentence Is Excessive
Stadtmiller contends the district court abused its discretion by failing to

adequately consider his substance abuse problems and his support for his family.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.1-18.) Stadtmiller's argument is without merit.
To determine whether the trial court abused its sentencing discretion, an
appellate court independently reviews "all of the facts and circumstances of the case,"
including the record, and considers the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender. State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492,500, 129 P.3d 1241, 1249 (2006). To prevail,
the appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence
is excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment.
Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005).

State v. Stover, 140

Those objectives are "(1) protection of

society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing." State v. Cross, 132
Idaho 667, 671, 978 P.2d 227, 231 (1999) (internal citations omitted).

"The 'primary

consideration [in imposing sentence] is, and presumptively always will be, the good
order and protection of society."' State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 137, 44 P.3d 1180,
1192 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103
(1956)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577,
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38 P.3d 614,615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000))
To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any
reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is
reasonable, however, if it appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of
protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or
retribution. Id.
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court expressly said it was
considering "rehabilitation, protecting society, retribution, making the victims whole,
those types of things that we're all aware of." (11/1/12 Tr., p.188, Ls.9-14.) Contrary to
Stadtmiller's argument that the district court failed to adequately consider his alcohol
abuse, the court made his alcohol problem the main point of consideration throughout
the sentencing hearing, as the court's following comments show:
You do have a significant substance abuse problem. . . . I didn't think
probation was appropriate. As far as a rider program, I'm not convinced
that that's the answer either in this case. I don't think that would give you
what you need to change significantly once you're out of prison. You will
be out of prison eventually. It's not going to be a lifetime sentence or
anything like that, so you will get out of prison. And between now and
then, there will be substance abuse counseling. There will be other types
of counseling, but I don't think a rider - which is a very short program. It
can be anywhere from three to nine months - would give you enough help
in order to get a real handle on the alcohol problem. It does appear to me
based on what I heard at the trial and so forth that what happened that
night was probably somewhat influenced, if not entirely influenced, by the
alcohol consumption. But, it is my opinion that a sentence in this case
should include incarceration at the State Board of Corrections [sic]. I'm
not convinced that it has to be an extremely long period of time since there
were no prior incidents, and since it is - everything seems to revolve
around alcohol I think those can be addressed with the appropriate
sentence.
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(11/1/12 Tr., p.189, L.14- p.190, L.20.) The record demonstrates that the district court
thoroughly considered Stadtmiller's alcohol abuse as a factor in its sentencing
determination.
Stadtmiller contends that the district court "also did not adequately consider [his]
own support of his family."

(Appellant's Brief, p.17.)

It appears that the support

Stadtmiller is referring to is based on a letter his sister, Lisa Bond, provided the court at
sentencing requesting Stadtmiller not be imprisoned because she had been given a
shortened life expectancy and their 82 year-old mother was in failing health.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.17-18.) The district court read Ms. Bond's letter and presumably
considered her concerns. (11/1 /12 Tr., p.175, Ls.9-20.) Despite the laudable reasons
for not wanting Stadtmiller to be imprisoned, those reasons were not enough to deter
Stadtmiller from engaging in his criminal conduct.

Inasmuch as the court's primary

objective was to protect society, its decision to imprison Stadtmiller was not an abuse of
discretion. See Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.
The district court also considered K.E.'s trial testimony, the Presentence Report
("PSI") and the psychosexual evaluation ("PSE"). (11/1/12 Tr., p.171, Ls.22-25; p.176,
Ls.3-8.) Stadtmiller's criminal record included at least 18 prior criminal convictions, two
of which were felonies - taking a motor vehicle without permission in 1992 and illegal
possession of a firearm in 2003.

(PSI, pp.3-7.)

The nature of Stadtmiller's crime

weighed in favor of incarceration as he took advantage of his friendship with Stacy
Ruzicka, whom K.E. considered her father, to violate ten year-old K.E.'s physical and
emotional well-being by fondling her vagina after she had gone to sleep in the couch in
her father's living room. Stadtmiller's actions had a harmful impact on K.E., who wrote:
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What happened to me made me feel sad and scared I'm am scared
to stay at my Dad's hous now and it made me feel unsafe when he touch
me. I thought I could troust him but I know I can't anymore. And I feel
mad that he did this to my life. And I also get scared at my mom's house
too. And like he scared my hole family what he has done to me."
(PSI, p.2 (verbatim).)
Despite the harm Stadtmiller caused, he refused to accept responsibility for his
actions. The psychosexual evaluator opined:
In looking at the overall dynamics of Mr. Stadtmiller's offenses, the
most prominent feature is his denial of them. By doing so he does not
have to assume any culpability. In a sense he is seeing himself as the
victim. This approach is probably not something he has used just for
these offenses but most likely has been used in other situations in his life.
. . . As testing has shown Mr. Stadtmiller has a hard time conforming his
behaviors to societal expectations. While this has not necessarily resulted
in very serious criminal acts, the accumulative effect of having several
minor acts is reflecting this. Usually by the time someone reaches the
fourth decade of their lives they begin to show a decline in such behavior.
Mr. Stadtmiller his [sic] continued to display them. This is not seen as a
good sign.
(PSE, p.16.)

The PSE evaluator concluded, "Looking at the combine [sic] rating

schedules, they are placing [Stadtmiller] somewhere in the moderate range for sexually
re-offending.

The primary precipitating factor would be his continued use of alcohol.

Under those circumstances he is more likely to act impulsively." (PSE, p.17.)
Inasmuch as appellate courts must take into account "the nature of the offense,
the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest[,]" State v.
Hopper, 119 Idaho 606, 608, 809 P.2d 467, 469 (1991 ), Stadtmiller's sentence is fully
warranted; he has a lengthy criminal history; his sexual offense was serious and caused
significant harm to K.E.; he refused to accept any responsibility for his crime; and given
his continued use of alcohol, he remains a moderate risk to commit yet another sex
offense.
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Given any reasonable view of the facts, Stadtmiller has failed to establish an
abuse of sentencing discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Stadtmiller's judgment of
conviction and sentence for sexual abuse of a minor under sixteen years of age.
DATED this yth day of November, 2013.
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